Written Testimony of
Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr.
President and CEO, SIFMA
Before the
Committee on Financial Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Dodd-Frank Turns 15: Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead
July 15, 2025

Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the Dodd-Frank Act, now fifteen years since its original passage. My name is Ken Bentsen, and I am the President and CEO of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).

The U.S. securities markets are the deepest and most liquid in the world. They are also the envy of the world. In the U.S., seventy-five percent of commercial activity is financed through our capital markets, significantly more than in other developed economies. In fact, I spent the last week in Europe meeting with UK and EU financial institutions and policy makers where both jurisdictions have prioritized the development of their capital markets to spur investment and economic growth like that we have here at home. Vibrant and healthy capital markets allow companies to invest in plant and equipment, spurring job creation and economic growth. Corporations, farmers, ranchers, investors, and governments utilize our capital markets to raise capital and credit and manage all types of risks. Our mortgage-backed securities market allows families to lock in a mortgage rate before buying a home. Cities, states and non-profits fund infrastructure projects, schools, and hospitals through the municipal bond market. The U.S. government funds daily operations through the Treasury market. And American workers prepare for their retirement, directly and through investment vehicles such as 401k retirement accounts, IRAs and pension funds, providing the investment capital that fuels our economy. Again, if you look around the world, virtually every other nation looks to our robust market and investment system as a model for economic development and growth. Therefore, it is critical that our policymakers tailor regulation not just to ensure transparency, protect investors, maintain fair and orderly markets and mitigate legitimate market risks, but to do so without unnecessarily disrupting or constraining the role capital markets play in fostering economic growth. Further, Congress has an important role to play beyond simply enacting the laws; it is important for Congress to periodically review previously enacted statutes to determine effectiveness, adherence to legislative intent, and impact on the markets. So I commend the Committee for holding this hearing.

Beyond question, our markets and related participants are among the most regulated sectors in the U.S. economy. Many regulations that affect the financial sector are essential to ensure fair and orderly markets, safety and soundness of the financial system, and protect investors, issuers, depositors, and consumers. But they are not without cost.

The post-2008 financial crisis regulatory and supervisory reforms, as culminated in the Dodd-Frank Act (“DFA,” or “Dodd-Frank”), were the most expansive financial regulatory actions since the 1930’s, then in response to the Great Depression. The Act, comprised of sixteen titles and resulting in approximately 400 rulemakings, significantly expanded the number, breadth and intensity of regulatory and supervisory requirements to which the U.S. financial sector is subject. Many of the policies required by Dodd-Frank or promoted in the aftermath of the financial crisis have made the U.S. financial system stronger and more resilient today than it was before 2010.

These changes have significantly decreased the probability that a major banking organization would fail during an extreme shock, and if so, reduced the potential contagion and cost if such a failure were to occur. In particular, U.S. banking organizations have materially more and higher quality capital today than pre-crisis, which provides them a larger buffer against failure if they experience unexpected losses. The rules also require such firms to depend less on “runnable” funding and instead maintain larger holdings of liquid assets to help them endure short-term market distress. And, encapsulated in Title II of the Act are extensive mechanisms to wind down a failing institution and mitigate exposure to the broader system and ultimately taxpayers.