Senate Banking Hearing on Iran Sanctions Relief

Senate Banking Committee

“The Implications of Sanctions Relief Under the Iran Agreement”

Wednesday, August 5, 2015 

Key Topics & Takeaways

  • Snap-Back Sanctions: Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) expressed concern over whether contracts signed by foreign companies doing business in Iran would be “grandfathered” if sanctions were to snap back into place so that already-signed contracts could be continued. Szubin agreed that is an important issue, and stressed that the deal does not allow grandfathered contracts, and any actions under new or previous contracts would be sanctionable.
  • Non-Nuclear Sanctions: Szubin said the sanctions regime targeting Iranian support for terrorist groups and the Assad regime would remain in place, and that European sanctions to this effect would also be maintained
  • Bank Sanctions: Levitt said U.S. secondary sanctions outside of the agreement will deter major financial institutions and some major corporations from doing business in Iran at least for a period of time, and “the banks probably for a long period of time.” 

Witnesses

Opening Statements

In his opening statement, Chairman Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) said many serious concerns have been raised regarding the Iran deal, especially regarding whether it would actually stop Iran in its path toward attaining a nuclear weapon. Fundamental problems remain with Iran, he said, because it remains a state sponsor of terrorism and a constant threat to the survival of Israel. Under these circumstances, he stressed that Congress must conduct a thorough review of the deal, and the Senate Banking Committee will review sanctions relief. He expressed concern that the sanctions relief would allow Iran to rejoin the international economic system, which over time would give Iran the financial means to increase its support of terrorism and regional stabilization. He also warned the mechanism for re-imposing sanctions may prove ineffective. 

In his opening statement, Ranking Member Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) noted that the Iran negotiations began under the Bush Administration. He said he was disappointed in the politicized nature of the debate over the sanctions, and including with colleagues who came out in opposition to the deal without reading it. He called on Congress to give the Iran deal the serious debate and consideration it deserves. 

Panel One Witness Testimony

Wendy Sherman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, State Department

Wendy Sherman, in her testimony, noted that sanctions relief is tied to specific steps that Iran must take to demonstrate the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, as well as verification of these steps. She added that the U.S. “will absolutely retain the ability to snap back both our own national sanctions and U.N. sanctions.” The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), she stressed, would cut off Iran’s access to fissile material for a nuclear weapon, as well as grant international inspectors “unprecedented continuous monitoring” at Iran’s declared and undeclared nuclear facilities. 

Sherman commented that while some have insisted that “doubling down” on sanctions could force Iran to agree to dismantle its nuclear program, this is “a fantasy” because sanctions were only meant to bring Iran to the negotiating table. She added that U.S. unilateral sanctions, in place for many years, have failed to hold back Iran’s nuclear program alone and stressed that U.S. partners would not walk away from the agreement even if the U.S. does. 

Adam Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Treasury Department

In his testimony, Adam Szubin discussed the impact of sanctions, the nature of sanctions relief under the agreement with Iran, and the sanctions that will remain in place to combat Iranian activity outside the nuclear sphere. Szubin said the global sanctions coalition provide the leverage to secure unprecedented concessions from Iran. He said the resulting agreement has three goals: 1) to close off Iran’s paths to a nuclear weapon; 2) ensure access to know if Iran is cheating; and 3) to preserve leverage to hold Iran to its commitments. The JCPOA, he stressed, achieves these objectives. 

Szubin said sanctions relief would include the lifting of nuclear-related secondary sanctions, but that the primary sanctions, the U.S. embargo, would remain in place and be enforced aggressively. He said this would keep Iran cut off from the world’s most important market and from using the most important currency. Under the deal, he said, more than 225 companies will remain designated. 

If Iran does not uphold its side of the bargain, Szubin said the U.S. and U.N. can “snap back” their sanctions. For U.S. sanctions, he said this can be done in a matter of days for all kinds of sanctions. If sanctions do snap back, he stressed that there is no grandfather clause for deals already in place, and any transactions would be sanctionable. 

Regarding Iran’s other malign activities, Szubin said the deal would not impact sanctions targeted at non-nuclear activities. In fact, he said the U.S. would sustain and intensify its use of sanctions against Iran’s backing of terrorist groups and for the development of missile programs. 

Szubin said sanctions worked to bring Iran to the table because of the international consensus. He stressed that U.S. sanctions alone, while extremely powerful, would not be enough to obtain a better deal. 

Questions and Answers

Snap Back Sanctions

Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) expressed concern over whether contracts signed by foreign companies doing business in Iran would be “grandfathered” if sanctions were to snap back into place so that already-signed contracts could be continued. Szubin agreed that is an important issue, and stressed that the deal does not allow grandfathered contracts, and any actions under new or previous contracts would be sanctionable. Sherman added that the European Union has affirmed this position as well. 

Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) asked what it means that activities after a snap back are “sanctionable.” Szubin said companies would face being cut off from the U.S. market. Sherman further explained that firms would have to leave Iran and unwind investments at risk of losing access to U.S. secondary markets and banking relationships. 

Sanctions Remaining in Place

Brown asked Szubin to describe the sanctions that would remain in place to limit Iran’s regional activities. Szubin said the sanctions regime targeting Iranian support for terrorist groups and the Assad regime would remain in place, and that European sanctions to this effect would also be maintained. He explained, however, that U.S. concerns about Iranian support for some groups such as Hezbollah are not shared worldwide, so not all nations would take part in the sanctions regime. 

U.N. and International Partners

Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.) asked how other partner nations would react if the U.S. were to reject the agreement. Szubin answered that the U.S. has enormous clout, but that it is not “all powerful” and that the U.S. cannot dictate the foreign policies of other countries. The international consensus, he said, has endorsed the deal, and the U.S. would be the only nation walking away. 

Sen. Mike Crapo (R-Idaho) asked what impact the approval of the JCPOA by the U.N. Security Council would have on unilateral U.S. sanctions. Szubin answered that it would have no impact on U.S. sanctions, but that it sets out a timetable for the lifting of U.N. economic sanctions. 

Sen. Ben Sasse (R-Neb.) asked whether Iran would get relief even if the U.S. does not approve the deal. Sherman answered that the U.S. could put its unilateral sanctions back in place while other countries would not. She said the impact of sanctions would not be as strong, and that the U.S. would be in a weaker position as a result. She conceded that the unilateral sanctions would still have some effect, but not as much as currently. 

Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) said that if the U.S. were to reject the deal, then the U.S. would need all the other nations who had worked on the deal to follow the U.S. lead. She asked if Szubin believed all the other nations would continue working with the U.S. to impose strong sanctions. Sherman answered that they would not because they only cooperated to achieve a diplomatic solution, which they believe has been accomplished. 

Panel Two Witness Testimony

Juan Carlos Zarate, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Juan Carlos Zarate, in his testimony, restated Iranian President Rouhani’s point that “sanctions threaten to drive Iran back into the stone age,” and noted that the sanctions were designed to isolate “rogue behavior.” He continued that the current sanctions relief framework is “flawed,” as it does not take into account increased risks from Iranian commercial and financial activity, and constrains the ability of the U.S. government to have financial power against Iranian non-nuclear risks. He stressed that the proposed agreement unwinds sanctions “too broadly” and may result in the U.S. “rehabilitating Iran’s economy.” Zarate explained that the agreement could “neuter” the financial power the U.S. has over Iran in the future, and that the U.S. will have to increase the use of financial measures “aggressively” to deal with the increased risks. He recommended the U.S. adopt “an aggressive financial constriction campaign,” to include secondary sanctions. 

Mark Dubowitz, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies

Mark Dubowitz, in his testimony, stressed that the Iran nuclear deal is “deeply flawed,” citing the sunset clause and nuclear snap back as the most “serious design defects.” He continued that the agreement is likely to create disagreements between the U.S. and European allies, as European countries currently invest in the Iranian market. Dubowitz stated that if U.S. economic pressure cannot stop Iran, “military force may become the only option,” which makes war with Iran “more likely.” He noted that the U.S. should use diplomatic “persuasion” and financial sanctions in order to keep Europe “out of Iran,” as Europe will not risk its ability to transact in dollars.  

Matthew Levitt, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Matthew Levitt, in his testimony, stressed that unless it is articulated that doing business with Iran still comes with risk, there is the potential to “rush head-first” into the Iranian market. He continued that the Administration’s “interpretation” of the agreement is that the U.S. will hinder Iran’s economic development in multiple ways, to include denying Iran access to the U.S. financial system and dollar, but that the problem is these “positions” are not publicly known and will only be effective if they are “aggressively publicized and then equally aggressively enforceable.” Failing to make these positions public, Levitt continued, may raise questions of whether the U.S. will actually act on the positions in the future. He explained that the Iran deal will allow “much of the world” to expand business with Iran, but that it needs to be known that Iran is a “tremendously risky jurisdiction.” Levitt concluded that secondary sanctions will be enforced solely by the U.S., but that other countries should “do their part holding Iran accountable for its illicit conduct.” 

Ambassador Nicholas Burns, Harvard University

Nicholas Burns, in his testimony, stated his support for the agreement, noting that it will “arrest” the forward movement of the Iranian nuclear program and continue sanctions on Iran. He noted his belief that two decades from now Iran will want to reconstitute its nuclear program, which could be done covertly and will be a problem for the U.S. Burns continued that a sanctions regime will have to be reapplied at that time, though it will be difficult. He stressed his belief that the benefits of the agreement outweigh the risks, as the program will be frozen for 10-15 years, and noted that the global coalition will “inevitably” weaken without the Iran deal. 

Questions and Answers

U.S. Unilateral Sanctions

Shelby asked if U.S. secondary sanctions alone would be able to keep major global companies from doing business in Iran even if European nations and others completely lift their own sanctions. Zarate replied that U.S. secondary sanctions, which would apply to third-country nationals and companies, would still have “enormous impact” in affecting what companies and countries decide to invest in. However, he stressed that this would depend on the “sense of enforcement” of those sanctions. 

Dubowitz agreed, saying that if Congress approves the deal then major financial institutions and energy companies would not be seen “rushing back in any way.” He said companies still have deep concerns over counterparty risk. If Congress does not approve the deal, he added, there would be even more reason for firms not to be “rushing in.” Because of this, he said Congressional disapproval would not lead to the collapse of the sanctions regime. 

Nuclear vs. Non-Nuclear Related Sanctions

Shelby, commenting that the integrity of the U.S. financial system is a major concern of the Committee, noted that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) found Iran to present “grave risk” to the financial system because of its lack of money laundering safeguards and the involvement of Iranian banks in supporting terrorism. He asked if there is reason to believe these problems would “go away any time soon” and whether it is safe for non-U.S. persons and entities to do business with Iranian banks. Levitt responded that these risks are not going away, but that FATF is talking specifically about terrorism and money laundering, not proliferation, so FATF warnings would remain in full force. 

Sanctions Planning

Shelby said sanctions are a critical tool of U.S. policy, and expressed concern that the U.S. government is not taking maximum advantage of this tool. He asked if any part of the U.S. government is tasked with “long-range strategic sanctions planning,” or if anyone is tasked with doing contingency planning for sanctions. Zarate said these responsibilities lie with the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence in concert with the intelligence community. However, he added that perhaps the Office must be more aggressive and forward-leaning in the use of sanctions power. 

Bank Sanctions

Brown asked whether, if Congress were to approve the deal, the Treasury Department could use bank sanctions in a more robust way to mitigate problems Levitt has identified with the agreement. Levitt replied that secondary sanctions will deter major financial institutions and some major corporations from doing business in Iran at least for a period of time, and “the banks probably for a long period of time.” However, he said the deal would lower concerns about Iran being a risky jurisdiction to do business in. 

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