Post-Trade Name Give-Up on Swap Execution Facilities
Summary
SIFMA provided comments to Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) on their Post-Trade Name Give Up on Swap Execution Facilities Proposal.
Excerpt
March 2, 2020
Mr. Christopher Kirkpatrick
Secretary
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20581
Re: Post-Trade Name Give-Up on Swap Execution Facilities; Proposed Rule– RIN 3038-AE79, 84 Fed. Reg. 72262 (Dec. 31, 2019)
Dear Mr. Kirkpatrick:
The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”)1 welcomes the opportunity to provide the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “Commission”) with comments on the above proposed rule (the “Proposal”) relating to post-trade name giveup (“PTNGU”) on swap execution facilities (“SEFs”). Although the views among our swap dealer members on PTNGU are not uniform, a majority of those who have expressed a view urge the Commission not to adopt the Proposal. These members continue to believe that PTNGU is an important protocol within this well-functioning market and that its prohibition will impair participants’ abilities to manage risk and provide liquidity. Additionally, these members do not believe there is evidence to support intervention by the Commission to prohibit PTNGU. Accordingly, in substantial part, we are restating our comments in our letter to the Commission, dated March 25, 2019.
We appreciate that the Commission has received a diverse range of views on this topic. While we do not believe there is evidence to support a prohibition of PTNGU, if the Commission does move ahead with a prohibition, we are in support of a measured approach to its implementation. In accordance with question 15 of the proposal, SIFMA agrees with the suggestion that at a minimum, any prohibition should exempt package trades that involve a non-swap instrument. Under the proposal, the non-swap leg of the trade would also be subject to the prohibition which may have several unintended consequences. In addition to our broader concerns with the prohibition, this segment of the market involves the use of infrastructure (such as securities settlement systems in the case of Treasury spreadover transactions). Complying with the prohibition would necessarily involve new costs and changes to how these trades are processed. In providing an exemption for packages, the Commission would provide itself with more time to analyze and understand the impact of a prohibition on the transaction as a whole, particularly in times of market stress.