No. 15-1037

United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, AS RECEIVER FOR CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK AND RECEIVER FOR STRATEGIC CAPITAL BANK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

STRATEGIC CAPITAL BANK,
Plaintiff,

v.

CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP., CREDIT SUISSE MANAGEMENT LLC, CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC, DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES INC., HSBC SECURITIES (USA) INC., RBS SECURITIES INC., UBS SECURITIES LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.

BEAR STEARNS ASSET BACKED SECURITIES I L.L.C., THE BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES L.L.C., JP MORGAN SECURITIES L.L.C., CITICORP MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC., CITIMORTGAGE, INC., CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC., MERRILL LYNCH MORTGAGE INVESTORS, INC., MERRILL LYNCH MORTGAGE CAPITAL, INC., MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH INC., ALLY SECURITIES LLC,
Defendants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 12 Civ. 4000 (LTS)

BRIEF OF *AMICUS CURIAE* SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES AND IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE

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CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

Pursuant to Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the undersigned states that *Amicus Curiae* does not issue stock or have a parent corporation that issues stock.

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INTEREST OF *AMICUS CURIAE*

The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association ("SIFMA") is an association of hundreds of securities firms, banks and asset managers, including many of the largest financial institutions in the United States. SIFMA's mission is to support a strong financial industry, investor opportunity, capital formation, job creation and economic growth, while building trust and confidence in the financial markets. SIFMA's members operate and have offices in all fifty states. SIFMA has offices in New York and Washington, D.C., and is the United States regional member of the Global Financial Markets Association.[1]

In this action, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") concedes it did not bring its claims under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") within the period allowed by its three-year statute of repose. Defendants sought the dismissal of those claims because they are barred by that statute of repose. The FDIC responded that Defendants' motion should be denied based on 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) (the "FDIC Extender Statute" or the "Statute"), which was enacted as part of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"). The FDIC Extender Statute extends the

[1] This brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any party, and no counsel or party other than *amicus curiae*, its members or their counsel made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief, in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 29(a).

"statute of limitations" for certain claims brought by the FDIC. However, the Statute clearly and unambiguously extends *only* the "statute of limitations" for the FDIC's state law "contract" and "tort" claims, and not the statute of repose for its Securities Act claims. Accordingly, the District Court properly rejected the FDIC's Extender Statute argument and granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The court explained that the plain language of the Statute, its legislative context, and the Supreme Court's decision in *CTS Corp. v. Waldburger*, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2189 (2014), compel the conclusion that the Statute "does not preempt the statute of repose set forth in Section 13 of the 1933 Act." JA 165-66. The FDIC's Securities Act claims are therefore time-barred.

SIFMA respectfully submits this brief in support of affirmance of the District Court's order dismissing the action. SIFMA and its members have a strong interest in this appeal for three principal reasons.

First, the Supreme Court in *CTS* enunciated clear and categorical principles on the questions (i) whether the Congressional extension of "statutes of limitations" for certain state law claims also extends statutes of repose for federal and statutory claims, and (ii) whether the clear and unambiguous text of a Congressional statute should yield to a lower court's view of the purpose of the statute. Those principles, which the court below correctly applied here, have a significant impact on SIFMA's members and the securities markets because they

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minimize uncertainty, which is the primary purpose of statutes of repose. The FDIC's arguments on this appeal would undermine those principles.

Second, SIFMA and its members rely on the fair, consistent and timely enforcement of securities laws to deter and remedy wrongdoing. One key component of that enforcement is the consistent application of the statutes of repose that are a critical part of those laws and serve purposes wholly distinct from statutes of limitation, including in particular the three-year statute of repose in Section 13 of the Securities Act. By establishing a definitive outside time limit for claims that cannot be tolled, statutes of repose provide the markets with a measure of certainty and finality, set a time after which market participants are free from the fear of lingering liabilities and stale claims, and ensure that claims can be adjudicated based on evidence that is fresh. This is important for financial planning and operations. The unwarranted narrowing of such statutes would undermine the finality upon which the orderly operation of the markets depends.

Third, SIFMA and its members recognize the importance of the application of federal securities and other laws as they are written by Congress, not based on subjective assertions of legislative purpose that do not account for the often competing objectives that lawmakers weigh in drafting legislation. That is essential to ensure predictability. Predictability is crucial for business planning and the effective and efficient functioning of the securities markets because it

allows participants to understand how to comply with the law and how the law will be enforced. SIFMA often appears as *amicus curiae* in appeals that implicate these concerns.

This case also has far-reaching practical significance for SIFMA's members and for the securities industry as a whole. The FDIC, the National Credit Union Administration Board ("NCUA") and the Federal Housing Finance Agency have brought numerous federal and state law securities claims against financial institutions that are barred by the Securities Act's three-year repose period or other applicable statutes of repose, but seek to avoid dismissal of such claims based on the same incorrect construction of extender statutes that the FDIC urges on this appeal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This appeal concerns the question whether the FDIC Extender Statute, which is expressly limited to the "applicable statute of limitations" for state law "contract" and "tort" claims should nevertheless also be applied to the statute of repose under the Securities Act. SIFMA supports Defendants' argument, and the District Court's holding, that the Statute should be construed in accordance with its plain language and the Supreme Court's prior rulings and thus should not apply to statutes of repose. SIFMA submits this brief to elaborate on the reasons why the

ruling below should be affirmed, and why the Statute should not be expanded beyond the limited scope expressly provided by Congress.

Congress long ago included in Section 13 of the Securities Act both a statute of limitations and a three-year statute of repose. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 77m.

In 1989, Congress enacted FIRREA, which added the FDIC Extender Statute that provides as follows:

> (14) *Statute of limitations* for actions brought by conservator or receiver
>
> (A) In general
>
> Notwithstanding any provision of any contract, *the applicable statute of limitations* with regard to any action brought by the [FDIC] as conservator or receiver shall be—
>
> > (i) in the case of any contract claim, the longer of—
> >
> > > (I) the 6-year period beginning *on the date the claim accrues*; or
> > >
> > > (II) *the period applicable under State law*; and
> >
> > (ii) in the case of *any tort claim* . . ., the longer of—
> >
> > > (I) the 3-year period beginning *on the date the claim accrues*; or
> > >
> > > (II) *the period applicable under State law*.
>
> (B) Determination of the date on which a claim accrues
>
> For purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which the *statute of limitation* begins to run on any claim described in such subparagraph shall be the later of—

> (i) the date of the appointment of the [FDIC] as conservator or receiver; or
>
> (ii) the date *on which the cause of action accrues*.

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) (emphasis added).

The Statute is clear and unambiguous. It extends only the "statute of limitations" for state law "contract" and "tort" claims brought by the FDIC as a conservator or receiver. Statutes of repose are not mentioned. Nothing in the Statute extends the statute of repose for any claims.

There was nothing novel about Congress drafting the Statute to override statutes of limitations while continuing to give effect to statutes of repose. The Supreme Court explained in *CTS* that Congress did just that in 1986 when it amended the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") to extend the "commencement date" of the statute of limitations, but not the repose period, for certain environmental actions under State law. 134 S. Ct. at 2191. The CERCLA extender provision, Section 9658, extends the statute of limitations for state law tort claims by persons exposed to a toxic contaminant. The Supreme Court found that Section 9658 extends *only* the statute of limitations and *not* statutes of repose.

Congress enacted the FDIC Extender Statute only three years after enacting Section 9658. As the District Court correctly found, applying *CTS*'s logic to the Statute compels the conclusion that, like the CERCLA extender statute

enacted only three years earlier, the Statute "does not preempt the statute of repose." JA 165-66. In contrast, the FDIC assumes that in 1989 Congress did not remember and no longer understood the distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose that the Supreme Court found Congress made three years earlier in CERCLA.

If statutes are interpreted based on the assumption that Congress does not understand or forgets critical distinctions between terms — such as the distinction between a statute of limitations and statutes of repose that *CTS* found Congress understood only three years before it enacted the Statute — and based on subjective judicial views of how best to accomplish legislative purposes, there is no limit to how statutes can be misconstrued. That would undermine the bedrock principle of predictability upon which SIFMA's members and all market participants rely. It is vital to the securities industry and financial markets that applicable laws are construed and applied as enacted by Congress, and that statutes of repose are strictly enforced. This Court should affirm the decision below.

ARGUMENT

I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE FDIC EXTENDER STATUTE AND THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN *CTS* REQUIRE THE AFFIRMANCE OF THE DECISION BELOW

A. The Supreme Court Held in *CTS* that a "Natural Reading" of CERCLA, Which Extends the "Statute of Limitations" for Certain Claims, Does Not Displace Statutes of Repose

CTS resolved a division among the lower courts as to whether Congressionally-enacted extender provisions that expressly apply to the "statute of limitations" also displace statutes of repose. The Supreme Court held CERCLA's extender provision does *not* displace statutes of repose. The Court based its ruling primarily on the "natural reading of [CERCLA's] text" which — like the FDIC Extender Statute — refers only to the "statute of limitations" and contains other textual features that are incompatible with applying it to statutes of repose. 134 S. Ct. at 2188.

B. The Plain Language of the FDIC Extender Statute also Applies Only to "the Applicable Statute of Limitations"

The application of *CTS* to the plain language of the Statute requires the affirmance of the decision below. The Supreme Court has long emphasized that "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself," and "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." *Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.*, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). This Court too has

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emphasized the importance of this approach to statutory construction. *See United States v. Desposito,* 704 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir.) ("In construing a statute, we begin with the plain language, giving all undefined terms their ordinary meaning. Absent ambiguity, our analysis also ends with the statutory language. We must presume that the statute says what it means."), *cert. denied*, 133 S. Ct. 2402 (2013). The District Court correctly applied this bedrock principle to the Statute, and followed the Supreme Court's logic and analysis in *CTS* concerning the textually similar CERCLA extender statute, in finding that the FDIC's claims here are time-barred by the Securities Act's statute of repose.

There is no dispute that the Securities Act contains a three-year statute of repose. *Police & Fire Retirement Sys. of Detroit v. Indymac MBS, Inc.*, 721 F.3d 95, 107 (2d Cir. 2013), *cert dismissed*, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014). This Court has ruled that a statute of repose, such as the one at issue here, "'extinguishes [a] cause of action ... after a fixed period of time ... regardless of when the cause of action accrued.'" *Id.* at 100 n.1 (alteration in original). "In contrast to statutes of limitations, statutes of repose 'create[] a *substantive* right in those protected to be free from liability after a legislatively-determined period of time.'" *Id.* at 106 (alteration in original).

There is also no dispute that the Statute, like the extender provision at issue in *CTS*, refers to the "statute of limitations" several times but never mentions

statutes of repose. *CTS* explained the "critical distinction" between those two concepts, and that Congress was well aware of the difference when it enacted the CERCLA extender statute in 1986, yet chose not to refer to statutes of repose. 134 S. Ct. at 2186.

Congress certainly retained that awareness three years later when it enacted the FDIC Extender Statute. As the District Court correctly found, the Statute "refers only to 'statute of limitations' in the singular, several times, and includes no reference to any statute of repose," JA 162, even though "Congress was well aware of the two distinct concepts and had enacted both types of provisions in the time frame surrounding the enactment of the" Statute. JA 164. *See also In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortg.-Backed Secs. Litig.*, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1037, 1039 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (a "search of the Congressional Record from 1985 until the enactment of FIRREA reveals at least forty-four separate uses of the phrase 'statute of repose' across twenty-seven different statements by members of Congress." These statements "both prior to and contemporaneous with the enactment of FIRREA suggest that Congress understood the meaning of the term 'statute of repose' but nevertheless failed to use it in the [FDIC] extender statute."); *FDIC v. Chase Mortg. Fin. Corp.*, 42 F. Supp. 3d 574, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("when faced with a statute which presented both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose, Congress chose language which focused on and changed the

statute of limitations, and left the statute of repose untouched. That gives no support to the FDIC's argument that it intended to replace both.")

In short, the Supreme Court's strict statutory construction in *CTS* applies with equal force here. Congress, in making a similar choice in the Statute to refer only to statutes of limitations did *not* displace statutes of repose.

C. The FDIC Substitutes Its Own View of the Purpose of the Statute for the Language Enacted By Congress

The FDIC gives short shrift to Congress's omission in the Statute of any reference to statutes of repose, even though the Supreme Court explained that the same omission in CERCLA was "instructive." 134 S. Ct. at 2185. Instead the FDIC grounds its argument on flawed logic.

For example, the FDIC bases its position that Congress intended the "applicable statute of limitations" to include statutes of repose on its view (Br. 13, 38-39) that Congress could not have wanted to grant the FDIC less than three years from the date of its appointment as receiver to bring any claims. But Congress did not say that in the Statute. Had Congress wanted to say that, and to displace statutes of repose, it would have been easy enough to do so.

The FDIC argues (Br. 28, 20-21) that the Statute's statement that it "shall apply" to "any action" indicates that it prescribes a mandatory limitations period for actions brought by the FDIC as receiver, and precludes the possibility that a statute of repose might shorten the three-year minimum period. But the fact

that a statute of limitations is mandatory does not make it applicable to statutes of repose. As the Supreme Court recently explained, most federal statutes of limitations contain similar "mandatory" language. *United States v. Wong*, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015). The use of "shall be" or similar language in a statute of limitations is therefore "of no consequence," and does not prevent a time limit from being an "ordinary, run-of-the-mill statute of limitations." *Id.* at 1632-33. The Statute itself says nothing that supports the FDIC's argument that excluding repose periods from this ambit would circumvent that mandatory language. To the contrary, Congress carefully limited the scope of the Statute to the creation of a new "statute of limitations," and did not change the applicable statutes of repose with respect to any action. By referring only to the "statute of limitations," Congress very clearly described what the Statute displaces — namely, only "the applicable statute of limitations."

Similarly, the FDIC argues (Br. 11-12) that the Statute's structure demonstrates that Congress intended to displace statutes of repose. That argument too rests on the assumption (Br. 28) that the Statute "does not create a 'narrow exception.'" In other words, the FDIC again *assumes* the outcome — that the Statute's reference to "the applicable statute of limitations" includes the applicable statutes of repose even though Congress did not say so.

The FDIC observes (Br. 12-13) that *CTS* recognized that Congress has on occasion used the term "statute of limitations" "in a less formal way." 134 S. Ct. at 2185. But there is nothing in the Statute that shows that Congress had any such intent here. The FDIC simply *assumes* that too.

For the same reasons, this Court should not follow the decisions in *FDIC v. RBS Secs., Inc.*, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13985 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2015), *petition for rehearing en banc filed* (5th Cir. Aug. 23, 2015), and *Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc.*, 764 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2014), *cert. denied*, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015). In *RBS Secs.*, the Fifth Circuit based its holding on its view that Congress could not have wanted to "provid[e] the FDIC with less than three years from the date of its appointment as receiver to bring claims" even though Congress did not say that in the Statute, that "[t]he FDIC Extender Statute did not create a new statute of limitations merely for the ordinary reasons" even though Congress did not say that in the Statute either, and that "[t]he text of the FDIC Extender Statute indicates that it prescribes a new mandatory statute of limitations for actions brought by the FDIC as receiver" even though that does not mean it displaces statutes of repose. 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13985, at *26, *34, *25. Similarly, in *Nomura*, the Tenth Circuit relied on its view that "the legislative purpose of FIRREA supports the conclusion that the Extender Statute

applies to statutes of repose," even though Congress mentioned only "the applicable statute of limitations." 764 F.3d at 1216-17.[2]

In short, the FDIC's argument that the text of the Statute and the Supreme Court's logic in *CTS* should give way to the FDIC's parochial pronouncements about the remedial purpose of the Statute, and the decisions of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits are simply untenable because they overlook not only the first principle of statutory construction described above — that the language of the Statute most control absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary — but also the fundamental nature of the legislative process.

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[2] Likewise, in *FDIC v. Rhodes*, the Nevada Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, incorrectly found that by using the term "shall" to mandate the "applicable statute of limitations" Congress thereby "barred the possibility that some other time limitation would apply to the FDIC's claim," 336 P.3d 961 1965 (Nev. 2014), even though "shall" applies only to the "statute of limitations" and does not mention the statute of repose. The court failed even to address *CTS*'s holding that the absence of any reference to "statute[s] of repose" is "instructive" in determining that an extender statute applies only to statutes of limitations. 134 S. Ct. at 2185.

This Court's pre-*CTS* decision in *Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas Inc.*, based on its assumption that Congress "used the term 'statute of limitations' to refer to statutes of repose," 712 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 2013), has been abrogated by the Supreme Court's ruling on the same issue in *CTS.* As the District Court correctly found, "[t]he analytical framework set out by the Supreme Court in [*CTS*] calls into question the Second Circuit's analysis of the extender provision of HERA in its *UBS* decision, implicitly overruling material aspects of the *UBS* decision's rationale." JA 165.

D. The FDIC's Argument Overlooks the Nature of the Legislative Process and that No Legislation Pursues Its Purposes at All Costs

When Congress crafts complex legislation, it balances competing policy goals. For example, CERCLA was concerned with the goals of environmental remediation, addressing public health threats, and imposing liability on persons responsible for hazardous waste. FIRREA was intended, among other things, "to reform, recapitalize, and consolidate the Federal deposit insurance system," and "enhance the regulatory and enforcement powers of Federal regulatory agencies" for financial institutions. 135 Cong. Rec. S10182-01, 101st Congress, First Session, 1989 WL 193738 (Aug. 4, 1989).

The Supreme Court in *CTS* rejected the argument that such goals — or judicial views as to how they are best achieved — can override the plain language of a statute. Instead, the Court reaffirmed the fundamental principle that "Congressional intent is discerned primarily from the statutory text." 134 S. Ct. at 2185.

The Supreme Court explained in *CTS* that "almost every statute might be described as remedial in the sense that all statutes are designed to remedy some problem," but "no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs." *Id.* (quoting *Rodriguez v. United States*, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987)). The compromises Congress reaches in trying to achieve its goals are reflected in the language it

enacts. As the Supreme Court observed in *Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp.*, 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986):

> Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some vague social or economic evil; however, because its Members may differ sharply on the means for effectuating that intent, the final language of the legislation may reflect hard-fought compromises. Invocation of the 'plain purpose' of legislation at the expense of the terms of the statute itself takes no account of the processes of compromise and, in the end, prevents the effectuation of congressional intent.

"Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice — and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that *whatever* furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law." *Rodriguez*, 480 U.S. at 525-26.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized in recent terms that legislation must be enforced in accordance with its plain language and not according to a judicial assessment of how best to effectuate a perceived legislative purpose. *See, e.g., Loughrin v. United States*, 134 S. Ct. 2384, 2390 (2014) (applying the "plain text" of the federal bank fraud statute, which does not require proof of intent to defraud a financial institution, even though that extends its coverage "to a vast range of fraudulent schemes, thus intruding on the historic criminal jurisdiction of the States"); *Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust*

Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196, 1199-1200 (2013) ("under the plain language of Rule 23(b)(3)," securities fraud plaintiffs are not required to prove materiality at the class-certification stage even though "certain 'policy considerations' militate in favor of requiring [such] proof").[3]

Thus, when the Ninth Circuit recently limited the statute of repose in Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 based on its view of the policy behind the statute, instead of applying its plain language, the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court's explanation is instructive as to why the FDIC Extender Statute should not be applied to statutes of repose here:

> Congress could have very easily provided that 'no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the filing of a statement under subsection (a)(2)(C).' But it did not. The text of [Section] 16 simply does not support [such a] rule. . . . [Respondent] disregards the most glaring indication that Congress did not intend that the limitations period be categorically tolled until the

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[3] *See also Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd.*, 132 S. Ct. 1997, 1999-2000, 2006 (2012) (the "ordinary meaning" of 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which awards costs for "compensation of interpreters," excludes the cost of document translation even though "it would be anomalous to require the losing party to cover translation costs for spoken words but not for written words"); *Hall v. United States*, 132 S. Ct. 1882, 1886-87, 1893 (2012) (under a "plain and natural reading" of Bankruptcy Code § 503(b), the phrase "a tax . . . incurred by the estate" does not cover tax liability resulting from individual debtors' sale of a farm even though "there may be compelling policy reasons for treating postpetition income tax liabilities as dischargeable"); *Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk*, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1887, 1890, 1895 (2011) (the word "report" in the False Claims Act's public disclosure bar "carries its ordinary meaning" and thus includes responses to FOIA requests even though this permits potential defendants to "insulate themselves from liability by making a FOIA request for incriminating documents").

> statement is filed: The limitations provision does not say so.

Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1419-20 (2012).

The Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded courts not to "improve" or "rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement" to carry out perceived legislative purposes. *Badaracco v. Comm'r*, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984). Untethering statutory construction from the plain language of the statute, and relying instead on subjective judicial speculation about how best to accomplish Congressional policy concerns would infringe on the role of our elected legislators. *See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee*, 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (declining to "read an absent word into the statute" out of "deference to the supremacy of the Legislature, as well as recognition that Congressmen typically vote on the language of a bill."); *Artuz v. Bennett*, 531 U.S. 4, 10 (2000) ("Whatever merits these and other policy arguments may have, it is not the province of this Court to rewrite the statute to accommodate them. . . . [T]he text . . . may, for all we know, have slighted policy concerns on one or the other side of the issue as part of the legislative compromise that enabled the law to be enacted.").

For these reasons, SIFMA strongly urges that the construction of the Statute should begin and end with its plain and unambiguous language. Failure to

follow express statutory language would create great uncertainty as to how laws will be interpreted and enforced.

II. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE FDIC EXTENDER STATUTE IS LIMITED TO STATE COMMON LAW CONTRACT AND TORT CLAIMS

The Statute does not apply to the FDIC's Securities Act claims for another independent reason. The plain language of the Statute refers only to state law "contract" and "tort" claims, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A), and not to federal claims or statutory claims. Contrary to the FDIC's arguments (Br. 33-34), the Statute's statement that it applies to "any *action* brought by" the FDIC does not have a broad displacing effect because it does not mean that it applies to every *claim* asserted in such actions. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A) (emphasis added).[4]

[4] The FDIC argues that the word "any" has an expansive meaning (Br. 20-21), but that word modifies the word "action," not "claim." The word "any" "must 'be limited' in [its] application 'to those objects to which the legislature intended [it] to apply.'" *Small v. United States*, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (2005). Moreover, "any" "can and does mean different things depending upon the setting." *Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League*, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004). It can "never change in the least [] the clear meaning of the phrase selected by Congress . . . ." *Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc.*, 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2042 (2012). Accordingly, courts commonly interpret its meaning in the context in which the word is used. *See, e.g.*, *Nixon,* 541 U.S. at 132 ("any entity" refers only to private and not public entities). The cases the FDIC cites on this point are not to the contrary. They interpret the relevant statutory language in accordance with its plain meaning and properly limit the application of the word "any" to the object identified in the statute. *See, e.g.*, *Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 552 U.S. 214, 220 (2008) ("any" "other law enforcement officer" means "law enforcement officers of whatever kind").

Congress's distinction in the text of the Statute between "actions" and "claims" within those actions demonstrates that it did not treat those words as synonyms. The Statute refers to and modifies the statutes of limitations for only two types of *claims* — "tort claim[s]" and "contract claim[s]" — and only to the extent those *claims* arise "under State law." *Id.* The text therefore provides no basis to read the Statute to apply to any other claim. Indeed, Congress could not have intended the Statute to apply to any other claims because it does not say *how* the statutes of limitations for any other claim should be changed.[5]

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[5] The fact that the Statute refers only to state law "contract" and "tort" claims further demonstrates Congress intended a narrow application, because it does not include claims "founded upon" a tort or a contract, unlike 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). The absence in the Statute of such "founded upon" language — which has been held, in the application of Section 2415, to invite analogies between statutory claims and tort or contract claims — reflects Congress's decision to limit the scope of the Statute's application to the state common law contract and tort claims to which it refers. *See Johnson v. United States*, 225 U.S. 405, 415 (1912) ("A change of [statutory] language is some evidence of a change of purpose."). Although a statutory claim may be "founded upon" a contract or tort, that does not mean a particular statutory claim is a "tort" or "contract" claim. In fact, numerous courts have ruled to the contrary. *See, e.g.*, *In re Zilog, Inc.*, 450 F.3d 996, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2006); *Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp.*, 872 F.2d 1124, 1127 (2d Cir. 1989). Indeed, even courts applying the broader language of Section 2415 have declined to apply it to *sui generis* statutory claims that are not grounded on common law claims. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Tri-No Enters., Inc.*, 819 F.2d 154, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1987) (claim under Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act for reclamation fees); *United States v. City of Palm Beach Gardens*, 635 F.2d 337, 339-40 (5th Cir. 1981) (claim under Hill-Burton Act for recovery of federal funds used in construction of non-profit hospital); *United States v. Lutheran Med. Ctr.*, 680 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982) (claim under Community Mental Health Center Act to recover federal grant).

Thus, since the FDIC's Securities Act claims here are statutory claims, and indeed *sui generis* statutory claims, not "tort" or "contract" claims, the FDIC Extender Statute does not apply to them. *See Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp.*, 872 F.2d 1124, 1127 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting and agreeing with SEC position that "Section 12(2) does not permit an analogy to tort or criminal law" and "is not derived from tort law principles"); *Burnett v. S.W. Bell Tel., L.P.*, 151 P.3d 837, 843 (Kan. 2007) (claim under ERISA § 510 is not a tort); *Benedetto v. PaineWebber Grp., Inc.*, 1998 WL 568328, at *4 (10th Cir. Sept. 1, 1998) (unpublished) (distinguishing securities and tort claims); *Malley-Duff & Assoc., v. Crown Life Ins. Co.*, 792 F.2d 341, 353 (3d Cir. 1986) ("civil RICO is truly *sui generis* and . . . particular claims cannot be readily analogized to causes of action known at common law") *aff'd*, 483 U.S. 143 (1987); *Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps. Inc.*, 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1981) (because the Lanham Act "created a *sui generis* federal statutory cause of action," common law trade dress infringement precedent was not controlling).

The Statute also should not be read to apply to federal claims because it would defeat the statutory purpose reflected in the text that there be *two* alternative statutes of limitations applicable to claims covered by the Statute, and would have the perverse effect of *reducing* the FDIC's time to bring some federal claims. The Statute's introductory paragraph states that the statute of limitations

for "contract" and "tort claims" — the only claims to which it refers — shall be "the longer of" a new period set forth in subparagraph (I) of the Statute or, pursuant to subparagraph (II), "the period applicable under State law." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A)(i) & (ii). But subparagraph (II) has no possible application to federal claims because it does not refer to the period applicable under federal law. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A)(i)(II) & (ii)(II). Thus, the Statute's reference to "the longer of" two applicable periods would make no sense as to federal claims if they were covered.

Furthermore, if the Statute's reference to "any tort claim" also applied to federal claims, it would not preserve the pre-existing federal statute of limitations for such federal claims when it is longer than the three year alternative provided by subparagraph (A)(ii)(I) of the Statute. Thus, that application would have the perverse effect of *reducing* to three years the FDIC's time to bring actions that would otherwise be governed by a longer federal statute of limitations. *See, e.g.*, *Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.*, 483 U.S. 143, 143 (1987) (four-year statute of limitations for RICO claims); 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (four-year statute of limitations for Clayton and Sherman Act claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (four-year statute of limitations for federal claims without a specific statute of limitations). There is nothing in the text of FIRREA to support that untoward outcome. For all of these reasons, the more natural and logical reading of the text

is that the FDIC Extender Statute does *not* apply to federal claims at all. *CTS*, 134 S. Ct. at 2188.[6]

The distinction between statutory claims created by Congress and state common law contract and tort claims is important to SIFMA and its members. When Congress enacts statutes that create new private securities law claims, the legislation reflects a balancing of public policies and competing factors. One of the key legislative determinations is the point at which such claims are deemed to be abolished by the passage of time, regardless of when the plaintiff's injury occurred or was discovered. That determination should not be overruled by statutes of limitations applicable to common law contract and tort claims.

III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED TO PRESERVE CONGRESSIONALLY-ENACTED STATUTES OF REPOSE

The FDIC, in urging its own view of how best to accomplish its own perception of the purpose of the FDIC Extender Statute, proclaims (Br. 38-40) the

[6] The FDIC has previously argued that this Court's *UBS* decision and the Tenth Circuit's holding in *Nomura I* require that the plain meaning of Congress's express limitation of the Extender Statute to "contract claim[s]" and "tort claim[s]" that arise "under State Law" be ignored. While those pre-*CTS* decisions did reject this limitation, they did so based on a judicial assessment of Congress's supposed purpose in passing the Extender Statute, the very mode of analysis *CTS* rejected. *See UBS*, 712 F.3d at 142 (exempting securities claims from the scope of the extender statute "would have undermined Congress's intent to restore Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to financial stability."); *Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc.*, 727 F.3d 1246, 1269 (10th Cir. 2013) ("Applying the Extender Statute to statutory claims serves the statute's purpose by providing NCUA sufficient time to investigate and file all potential claims. . . .").

importance *to the FDIC* of the displacement of statutes of repose, but does not address the enormous importance of the Congressionally-enacted statutes of repose the FDIC seeks to displace. Statutes of repose in general, and the Securities Act's three-year statute of repose for strict liability claims in particular, are critical to ensure certainty and finality in the securities industry.

CTS explained the important rationale behind such statutes: "[s]tatutes of repose effect a legislative judgment that a defendant should 'be free from liability after the legislatively determined period of time'. . . . Like a discharge in bankruptcy, a statute of repose can be said to provide a fresh start or freedom from liability." 134 S. Ct. at 2183. *See also Bradway v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross*, 992 F.2d 298, 301 n.3 (11th Cir. 1993) ("In passing a statute of repose, a legislature decides that there must be a time when the resolution of even just claims must defer to the demands of expediency."); *Caviness v. Derand Res. Corp.*, 983 F.2d 1295, 1300 n.7 (4th Cir. 1993) (statute of repose "serves the need for finality in certain financial and professional dealings").

Statutes of repose are particularly important to ensure finality in the context of strict liability claims under the Securities Act. As the Tenth Circuit has explained, the "legislative history in 1934 makes it pellucid that Congress included statutes of repose because of fear that lingering liabilities would disrupt normal business and facilitate false claims. It was understood that the three-year rule [in

Section 13] was to be absolute." *Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co.*, 939 F.2d 1420, 1435 (10th Cir. 1991), *judgment vacated on other grounds by Dennler v. Trippet*, 503 U.S. 978 (1992). Indeed, Congress quickly shortened the Securities Act's statute of repose to three years when it realized that the strict liability the Act created was stifling the economy. 78 Cong. Rec. 8709-10 (1934) ("it is well known that because of this law the issuance of securities has practically ceased").

No less today than 80 years ago, statutes of repose enable financial institutions to free up for productive use capital that might otherwise be tied up indefinitely in reserves to cover potential liability. The SEC has extolled the beneficial purposes of the Securities Act's statute of repose: "The three-year provision assures businesses that are subject to liability under [Sections 11 and 12] that after a certain date they may conduct their businesses without the risk of further strict liability for non-culpable conduct." Brief of the SEC, as Amicus Curiae, *P. Stolz Family Partnership L.P. v. Daum*, 355 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-7680), 2003 WL 23469697, at *8.

Section 13's statute of repose is also critical because it protects market participants from "the problems of proof . . . that arise if long-delayed litigation is permissible." *Norris v. Wirtz*, 818 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1987). It further prevents strategic delay by plaintiffs, who could otherwise seek "recoveries based on the wisdom given by hindsight" and the "volatile" prices of securities. *Short v.*

Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1392 (7th Cir. 1990). Instead, statutes of repose encourage prompt enforcement of the securities laws and serve cultural values of diligence. They also protect new shareholders, bondholders and management from liability for conduct that occurred at a time when they were not associated with the business. Allowing the FDIC's claims here to proceed would undercut these important objectives.

The Supreme Court's decision and analysis of the CERCLA extender statute in *CTS* have put to rest any question whether similar extender statutes apply to statutes of repose. The court below and other courts have recognized this. *See, e.g.*, *FDIC v. Bear Stearns Asset Backed Secs. I LLC,* 2015 WL 1311300, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.) (FDIC Extender Statute "does not preempt the statute of repose set forth in Section 13"), *appeal filed* (2d Cir. Apr. 7, 2015); *In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.*, No. 12-CV-3279 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2014) ECF No. 196 ("the [FDIC] Extender Statute does not displace the [federal Securities] Act's statute of repose"); *FDIC v. Chase*, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 579 ("The FDIC Extender Statute does not alter applicable statutes of repose"); *see also NCUA v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,* 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181149, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2013) (pre-*CTS* decision that 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14) does not displace statutes of repose), *interlocutory appeal pending*, No. 13-56851 (9th Cir.). These courts have

acknowledged the critical importance of statutes of repose and refused to modify the substantive repose rights created by legislatures.

SIFMA strongly urges that to the extent that the Statute is interpreted in accordance with its perceived purpose, and not simply its plain and unambiguous language as required by Supreme Court precedent, the purpose of preserving critically important substantive repose rights created by Congress should be a paramount consideration in arriving at an understanding why Congress chose not to refer to statutes of repose in the Statute.

IV. THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF THE FDIC

The brief submitted by the NCUA and the FHFA as *amici curiae* argues for a "presumption" in favor of the construction of the FDIC Extender Statute that is proposed by government parties. *See* NCUA/FHFA Brief at 26-27. No such presumption should apply here for several reasons. *First*, the FDIC, as receiver for Citizens National Bank and Strategic Capital Bank, is acting as a private plaintiff and is not entitled in that role to any presumption that may be available to the government. *See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC*, 512 U.S. 79, 86 (1994) (FDIC "steps into the shoes" of a private plaintiff when it acts as a receiver). *Second*, such a presumption could apply only if the FDIC Extender Statute were ambiguous, but it is *not* ambiguous. Its plain language specifically applies only to "statute[s] of limitations" and does not refer to "statutes of repose"

or statutory claims such as the FDIC's claims under the Securities Act. *Third*, a presumption should not be applied here to upset the balance of policy considerations discussed above.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's decision should be affirmed.

September 10, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: September 10, 2015

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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing, as submitted in digital form via the Court's ECF system, is an exact copy of the written document filed with the Clerk and has been scanned for viruses with McAfee's VirusScan Enterprise 8.8 and, according to the program, is free of viruses.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 10th day of September 2015:

I presented *Amicus Curiae's* Brief to the Clerk of the Court for filing and uploading to the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.

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